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Abstract : Birnbaum’s theorem, that the sufficiency and conditionality princi-
ples entail the likelihood principle, has engendered a great deal of controversy
and discussion since the publication of the result in 1962. In particular, many
have raised doubts as to the validity of this result. Typically these doubts are
concerned with the validity of the principles of sufficiency and conditionality
as expressed by Birnbaum. Technically it would seem, however, that the proof
itself is sound. In this paper we use set theory to formalize the context in which
the result is proved and show that in fact Birnbaum’s theorem is incorrectly
stated as a key hypothesis is left out of the statement. When this hypothesis is
added, we see that sufficiency is irrelevant, and that the result is dependent on
a well-known flaw in conditionality that renders the result almost vacuous.
Key words and phrases : sufficiency, conditionality, likelihood, relations, equiva-
lence relations.
1 Introduction
A result presented in Birnbaum (1962), and referred to as Birnbaum’s theorem,
is very well-known in statistics. This result says that a statistician who accepts
both the sufficiency S and conditionality C principles must also accept the
likelihood principle L and conversely. The result has always been controversial
primarily because it implies that a frequentist statistician who accepts S and C is
forced to ignore the repeated sampling properties of any inferential procedures
they use. Given that both S and C seem quite natural to many frequentist
statisticians while L does not, the result is highly paradoxical.
Various concerns have been raised about the proof of the result. For example,
Durbin (1970) argued that the theorem fails to hold whenever C is restricted
by requiring that any ancillaries used must be functions of a minimal sufficient
statistic. Kalbfleisch (1975) argued that C should only be applicable when
the value of the ancillary statistic used to condition is actually a part of the
experimental make-up. This is called the weak conditionality principle. In
Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986) it is argued that Birnbaum’s theorem, and
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a similar result that accepting C alone is equivalent to accepting L, are invalid
because the specific uses of S and C in proving these results can be seen to be
based on flaws in their formulations. For example, Birnbaum’s theorem requires
a use of S and C where the information discarded by S as irrelevant, which is
the primary motivation for S, is exactly the information used by C to condition
on and so identifies the discarded information as highly relevant. As such S and
C contradict each other. We note that this is precisely what Durbin’s restriction
on the ancillaries avoids. Furthermore, the result that C alone implies L can be
seen to depend on the lack of a unique maximal ancillary which can be viewed
as an essential flaw in C. Also, see Holm (1985), Barndorff-Nielsen (1995)
and Helland (1995) for various concerns about the formulation of the theorem.
Mayo (2010) argues that, in the context of a repeated sampling formulation for
statistics, we cannot simultaneously have S and C true, as when S is true then
C is false and when C is true then S is false. Gandenberger (2012) offers up a
proof that avoids some of the objections raised by others.
Many of these reservations are essentially with the hypotheses to the theorem
and suggest that Birnbaum’s theorem should be rejected because the hypotheses
are either not acceptable or have been misapplied. It is the purpose of this pa-
per to provide a careful set-theoretic formulation of the context of the theorem.
When this is done we see that there is a hypothesis that needs to be formally
acknowledged as part of the statement of Birnbaum’s theorem. With this ad-
dition, the force of the result is lost and the paradox disappears. The same
conclusions apply to result that C is equivalent to L and, in fact, this is really
the only result as S is redundant in Birnbaum’s theorem when the additional
hypothesis is formally acknowledged.
For our discussion it is important that we stick as closely as possible to
Birnbaum’s formulation. To discuss the proof, however, we have to make cer-
tain aspects of Birnbaum’s argument mathematically precise that are somewhat
vague in his paper. It is always possible then that someone will argue that we
have done this in a way that is not true to Birnbaum’s intention. We note,
however, that this is accomplished in a very simple and direct way. If there is
another precise formulation that makes the theorem true, then it is necessary
for a critic of how we do this to provide that alternative.
A basic step missing in Birnbaum (1962) was to formulate the principles
as relations on the set I of all model and data combinations. So I is the set
of all inference bases I = (E, x) where E = (XE , {fE,θ : θ ∈ ΘE}), XE is a
sample space, {fE,θ : θ ∈ ΘE} is a collection of probability density functions
on XE , with respect to some support measure µE on XE , and x ∈ XE is the
observed data. We will ignore all measure-theoretic considerations as they are
not essential for any of the arguments. If the reader is concerned by this, then
we note that the collection of models where XE and ΘE are finite and µE is
counting measure is rich enough to produce the paradoxical result. So in general
we can consider our discussion restricted to the case where XE and ΘE are finite.
It is our view that infinite sets and continuous probability measures are not
necessary for the development of the basic principles of statistics. Rather the
use of infinite sets and continuity represents approximations to a finite reality
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and appropriate restrictions must be employed on such quantities so that we are
not mislead by purely mathematical considerations. In spite of our restrictions,
most of our development applies equally well under very general circumstances.
We note that expressing the principles as relations was part of Evans, Fraser
and Monette (1986) this is taken further here. In Section 2 we discuss the
meaning and use of relations generally. In Section 3 we apply our discussion of
relations to Birnbaum’s theorem. In Section 4 we draw some conclusions.
2 Relations
A relation R with domain D is a subset R ⊂ D ×D. Saying (x, y) ∈ R means
that the objects x and y have a property in common. For example, suppose D
is the set of students enrolled at a specific university at a specific point in time.
Let R1 be defined by (x, y) ∈ R1 whenever x and y are students in the same
class. Let R2 be defined by (x, y) ∈ R2 whenever x and y have taken a course
from the same professor.
A relation R is reflexive if (x, x) ∈ R for all x ∈ D, symmetric if (x, y) ∈ R
implies (y, x) ∈ R, and transitive if (x, y) ∈ R, (y, z) ∈ R implies that (x, z) ∈
R. If a relation R is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, then R is called an
equivalence relation. Clearly R1 is an equivalence relation and, while R2 is
reflexive and symmetric, it is not typically transitive and so is not an equivalence
relation. While (x, y) ∈ R implies that x and y are related, perhaps by the
possession of some property, when R is an equivalence relation this implies that
x and y possess the property to the same degree. We say that relation R on D
implies relation R′ on D whenever R ⊂ R′. Clearly we have that R1 ⊂ R2.
If R is a relation on D, then the equivalence relation R¯ generated by R is
the smallest equivalence relation containing R.We see that R¯ is the intersection
of all equivalence relations on D containing R. Also we have that
R¯ = {(x, y) : ∃n, x1, . . . , xn ∈ D with x = x1, y = xn and
(xi, xi+1) ∈ R or (xi+1, xi) ∈ R}. (1)
It is not always clear that R¯ has a meaningful interpretation, at least as
it relates to the property being expressed by R. For example, R¯2 is somewhat
more difficult to interpret and surely goes beyond the idea that R2 is perhaps
trying to express, namely, that two students were directly influenced by the
same professor. In fact, it is entirely possible that R¯2 = D × D. As another
example, suppose that D = {2, 3, 4, . . .} and (x, y) ∈ R when x and y have
a common factor bigger than 1. Then R is reflexive and symmetric but not
transitive. If x, y ∈ D then (x, xy) ∈ R, (xy, y) ∈ R so R¯ = D × D and R¯ is
saying nothing. It seems that each situation, where we extend a relation R to
an equivalence relation, must be examined to see whether or not this extension
has any meaningful content for the application.
Now suppose we have relations R1 and R2 on D and consider the relation
R1 ∪R2. The following result is relevant to our discussion in Section 3.
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Lemma 1. R¯1 ∪ R¯2 = R1 ∪R2.
Proof: We have that R1 ∪ R2 ⊂ R¯1 ∪ R¯2 so R1 ∪R2 ⊂ R¯1 ∪ R¯2 while R¯1 ⊂
R1 ∪R2, R¯2 ⊂ R1 ∪R2 implies R¯1 ∪ R¯2 ⊂ R1 ∪R2.
This says that the equivalence relation generated by the union of relations is
equal to the equivalence relation generated by the union of the correspond-
ing generated equivalence relations. Furthermore, it is clear that the union of
equivalence relations is not in general an equivalence relation.
3 Statistical Relations and Principles
We define a statistical relation to be a relation on I and a statistical principle to
be an equivalence relation on I. The idea behind a statistical principle, as used
here, is that equivalent inference bases contain the same amount of statistical in-
formation about the unknown θ.We make no attempt to give a precise definition
of what statistical information means. Birnbaum (1962) identified two inference
bases I1, I2 ∈ I as containing the same amount of statistical information via
the notation Ev(I1) = Ev(I2). We consider several statistical relations.
The likelihood relation L on I is defined by (I1, I2) ∈ L whenever ΘE1 = ΘE2
and there exists c > 0 such that fE1,θ(x1) = cfE2,θ(x2) for every θ. We have the
following obvious result.
Lemma 2. L is a statistical principle.
Actually the likelihood principle does not completely express the idea that
two inference bases with the same likelihood function contain the same amount
of statistical information. For this we need another statistical relation. We
define the invariance relation G by (I1, I2) ∈ G whenever there exist 1-1, onto,
smooth functions g : XE1 → XE2 , h : ΘE1 → ΘE2 with g(x1) = x2 and
such that fE1,θ(x) = fE2,h(θ)(g(x))J
−1
g (x) for every x ∈ XE1 where Jg(x) =
(det(∂g(x)/∂x))−1 = 1 in the discrete case. We have the following result.
Lemma 3. G is a statistical principle.
Now consider the equivalence relation L ∪G. If (I1, I2) ∈ L and (I2, I3) ∈ G,
then, for some constant c > 0 and mappings g and h, fE1,θ(x1) = cfE2,θ(x2) =
cfE3,h(θ)(g(x3))J
−1
g (x3) = c
′fE3,h(θ)(g(x3)) and, so after relabelling, I1 and I3,
have proportional likelihoods. Similarly, if (I1, I2) ∈ G and (I2, I3) ∈ L, then
again, after relabelling, I1 and I3 have proportional likelihoods. So (I1, I2) ∈
L ∪G just expresses the fact that I1 and I2 have proportional likelihoods, per-
haps after relabelling the data and the parameter. In this case we can state
clearly what the equivalence relation L ∪G expresses and the generated equiv-
alence relation makes sense. We do not need L ∪G, however, for a discussion
of Birnbaum’s result.
The sufficiency relation S is defined by (I1, I2) ∈ S whenever ΘE1 = ΘE2
and there exist minimal sufficient statistics m1 for E1 and m2 for E2 such that
the marginal models induced by the mi are the same and m1(x1) = m2(x2). We
have the following result.
Lemma 4. S is a statistical principle and S ⊂ L.
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Proof: Clearly S is reflexive and symmetric and S ⊂ L. Suppose (I1, I2) ∈ S
via the minimal sufficient statistics m1 and m2 and (I2, I3) ∈ S via the minimal
sufficient statistics m′2 and m3. Since any two minimal sufficient statistics are
1-1 functions of each other, there exists 1-1 function h such that m′2 = h ◦m2.
Then (I1, I3) ∈ S via the minimal sufficient statistics h ◦m1 and m3.
Obviously we have the result that (I1, I2) ∈ S whenever I2 can be obtained from
I1 via a sufficient statistic or conversely. Furthermore, it makes sense to extend
S to S ∪G.
The conditionality relation C is defined by (I1, I2) ∈ C whenever ΘE1 = ΘE2 ,
x1 = x2 and there exists ancillary statistic a for E1 such that the conditional
model given a(x1) is given by E2 or with roles of I1 and I2 reversed. We have
the following result.
Lemma 5. C is reflexive and symmetric but is not transitive and C ⊂ L.
Proof: The reflexivity, symmetry and C ⊂ L are obvious. The lack of transitiv-
ity follows via a simple example. Consider the model E with XE = {1, 2}
2,ΘE =
{1, 2} and with fE,θ given by Table 1. Now note that U(x1, x2) = x1 and
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,1(x1, x2) 1/6 1/6 2/6 2/6
fE,2(x1, x2) 1/12 3/12 5/12 3/12
Table 1: Unconditional distributions.
V (x1, x2) = x2 are both ancillary and the conditional models, when we observe
(x1, x2) = (1, 1), are given by Tables 2 and 3.
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,1(x1, x2 |U = 1) 1/2 1/2 0 0
fE,2(x1, x2 |U = 1) 1/4 3/4 0 0
Table 2: Conditional distributions given U = 1.
(x1, x2) (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
fE,1(x1, x2 |V = 1) 1/3 0 2/3 0
fE,2(x1, x2 |V = 1) 1/6 0 5/6 0
Table 3: Conditional distributions given V = 1.
The only ancillary for both these conditional models is the trivial ancillary
(the constant map). Therefore, there are no applications of C that lead to
the inference base I2, given by Table 2 with data (1, 1), being related to the
inference base I3, given by Table 3 with data (1, 1). But both of I2 and I3 are
related under C to the inference base I1 given by Table 1 with data (1, 1). This
establishes the result.
Note that even under relabellings, the inferences bases I2 and I3 in Lemma 5
are not equivalent.
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If we are going to say that (I1, I2) ∈ C means that I1 and I2 contain an
equivalent amount of information under C, then we are forced to expand C to C¯
so that it is an equivalence relation. But this implies that the two inference bases
I2 and I3 presented in the proof of Lemma 5 contain an equivalent amount of
information and yet they are not directly related via C. Rather they are related
only because they are conditional models obtained from a supermodel that has
two essentially different maximal ancillaries.
Saying that such models contain an equivalent amount of statistical infor-
mation is clearly a substantial generalization of C. Note that, for the example in
the proof of Lemma 5, when (1, 1) is observed, the MLE is θˆ(1, 1) = 1. To mea-
sure the accuracy of this estimate we can compute the conditional probabilities
based on the two inference bases, namely,
P1(θˆ(x1, x2) = 1 |U = 1) = 1/2, P2(θˆ(x1, x2) = 2 |U = 1) = 3/4
P1(θˆ(x1, x2) = 1 |V = 1) = 1/3, P2(θˆ(x1, x2) = 2 |V = 1) = 5/6
and so the accuracy of θˆ is quite different depending on whether we use I2 or I3.
It seems unlikely that we would interpret these inference bases as containing an
equivalent amount of information in a frequentist formulation of statistics. As
noted in Section 2, there is no reason why we have to accept the equivalences
given by a generated equivalence relation unless we are certain that this equiv-
alence relation expresses the essence of the basic relation. It seems clear that
there is a problem with the assertion that (I1, I2) ∈ C¯ means that I1 and I2
contain an equivalent amount of information without further justification.
We now follow a development similar to that found in Evans, Fraser and
Monette (1986) to prove the following result.
Theorem 6. C ⊂ C¯ = L where the first containment is proper.
Proof: Clearly C ⊂ C¯ and this containment is proper by Lemma 5. If (I1, I2) ∈
C¯, then (1) implies (I1, I2) ∈ L since C ⊂ L and so C¯ ⊂ L. Now suppose that
(I1, I2) ∈ L. We have that fE1,θ(x1) = cfE2,θ(x2) for every θ for some c > 0.
Assume first that c > 1. Now construct a new inference base I∗1 = (E
∗
1 , (1, x1))
where XE∗
1
= {0, 1} × XE1 , and {fE∗1 ,θ : θ ∈ ΘE1} is given by Table 4 where
x10, x100, . . . are the elements of XE1 not equal to x1 and p ∈ [0, 1) satisfies
p/(1 − p) = 1/c. Then we see that U(i, x) = i is ancillary as is V given by
x1 x10 x100 · · ·
i = 1 pfE1,θ(x1) pfE1,θ(x10) pfE1,θ(x100) · · ·
i = 0 1− p− pfE1,θ(x1) pfE1,θ(x1) 0 · · ·
Table 4: The model E∗1 .
V (i, x) = 1 when x = x1 and V (i, x) = 0 otherwise. Conditioning on U(i, x) = 1
gives that (I∗1 , I1) ∈ C while conditioning on V (i, x) = 1 gives that (I
∗
1 , I) ∈ C
where I = (({0, 1}, {pθ : θ ∈ ΘE1}), 1) and pθ is the Bernoulli(fE1,θ(x1)/c)
probability function. Now, using I2 we construct I
∗
2 by replacing p by 1/2 and
fE1,θ(x1) by fE2,θ(x2) in Table 4 and obtain that (I
∗
2 , I) ∈ C since fE1,θ(x1)/c =
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fE2,θ(x2). Using (1) we have that (I1, I2) ∈ C¯. If c ≤ 1 we start the construction
process with I2 instead. This proves that C¯ = L.
The proof that L ⊂ C¯ relies on discreteness. This was weakened in Evans,
Fraser and Monette (1986) and even further weakened in Jang (2011).
We now show that Birnbaum’s proof actually establishes the following result.
Theorem 7. S ∪ C ⊂ L ⊂ S ∪ C
Proof: The first containment is obvious. For the second suppose that (I1, I2) ∈
L. We construct a new inference base I = (E, y) from I1 and I2 as follows. Let
E be given by XE = (1,XE1) ∪ (2,XE2),
fE,θ(1, x) =
{
(1/2)fE1,θ(x) when x ∈ XE1
0 otherwise,
fE,θ(2, x) =
{
(1/2)fE2,θ(x) when x ∈ XE2
0 otherwise.
Then
g(i, x) =
{
(i, x) when x /∈ {x1, x2}
{x1, x2} otherwise
is sufficient for E and so ((E, (1, x)), (E, (2, x))) ∈ S by the comment after
Lemma 4. Also, h(i, x) = i is ancillary for E and thus ((E, (1, x1)), (E1, x1)) ∈ C
and ((E, (2, x2)), (E2, x2)) ∈ C. Then by (1) we have that ((E1, x1), (E2, x2)) ∈
S ∪ C and we are done.
Note that Birnbaum’s proof only proves the containments with no equalities but
we have the following result.
Theorem 8. S ∪ C is properly contained in L while L = S ∪ C.
Proof: To show that S∪C ⊂ L is proper, suppose that E1 is the Bernoulli(θ), θ ∈
(0, 1] model, E2 is the Geometric(θ), θ ∈ (0, 1] model and we observe x1 = 1 and
x2 = 0 so fE1,θ(1) = θ = fE2,θ(0). Note that the full data is minimal sufficient
for both E1 and E2 with XE1 = {0, 1},XE2 = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and further that
both of these models have only trivial ancillaries. Therefore, if Ii = (Ei, 1) we
have that (I1, I2) /∈ S, (I1, I2) /∈ C but (I1, I2) ∈ L which proves that S ∪ C is
properly contained in L.
To prove that the second containment is exact we have, using (1), that
(I1, I2) ∈ S ∪ C implies that I1 and I2 give rise to proportional likelihoods as
this is true for each element of S ∪ C and so S ∪ C ⊂ L.
So we do not have, as usually stated for Birnabum’s theorem, that S and
C are together equivalent to L but we do have that S ∪ C is equivalent to L.
Acceptance of S ∪C is not entailed, however, by acceptance of both S and C
as we have to examine the additional relationships added to S ∪ C to see if
they make sense. If one wishes to say that acceptance of S and C implies the
acceptance of S ∪ C, then a compelling argument is required for these additions
and this seems unlikely. From the example of the proof of Theorem 8 we can
see that acceptance of S ∪ C is indeed equivalent to acceptance of L.
From Theorems 6 and Theorem 7 we have the following Corollary.
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Corollary 9. S ∪ C ⊂ C¯ = L where the first containment is proper. Further-
more, S ⊂ C¯ and this containment is proper.
A direct proof that S ⊂ C¯ has been derived by Jang (2011). It is interesting to
note that Corollary 9 shows that the existence of S in the modified statement
of Birnbaum’s theorem, where we require that we accept all the equivalences
generated by S and C, is irrelevant as it is not required. This is a reassuring
result as it is unlikely that S is defective but it is almost certain that C is
defective, at least as currently stated. Also we have the following result.
Lemma 10. C ∪G = L ∪G
Proof: This is immediate from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3.
This says that the equivalences obtained by combining invariance under rela-
belling with conditionality are the same as the equivalences obtained by com-
bining invariance under relabelling with likelihood.
As with the proof of Birnbaum’s theorem, the proof that C = L provided
in Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986) is really a proof that C¯ = L. This can
be seen from the proof of Theorem 6. So accepting the relation C is not really
equivalent to accepting L unless we agree that the additional elements of C¯
make sense. This is essentially equivalent to saying that it doesn’t matter which
maximal ancillary we condition on and it is unlikely that this is acceptable to
most frequentist statisticians and this is illustrated by the discussion concerning
the example in Lemma 5.
As noted in Durbin (1970), requiring that any ancillaries used in an ap-
plication of C be functions of a minimal sufficient statistic voids Birnabum’s
proof, as the ancillary statistic used in the proof of Theorem 7 is not a func-
tion of the sufficient statistic used in the proof. It is not clear, however, what
this restriction does to the result C¯ = L, but we note that there are situa-
tions where there exist nonunique maximal ancillaries which are functions of
the minimal sufficient statistic. In these circumstances we would still be forced
to conclude the equivalence of inference bases derived by conditioning on the
different maximal ancillaries if we reasoned as in Evans, Fraser and Monette
(1986). Of course, we are arguing here that the result requires the statement of
an additional hypothesis.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that the proof in Birnbaum (1962) did not prove that S and C
lead to L. Rather the proof establishes that S ∪ C = L and this is something
quite different. The statement of Birnbaum’s theorem in prose should have
been: if we accept the relation S and we accept the relation C and we accept
all the equivalences generated by S and C together, then this is equivalent to
accepting L. The essential flaw in Birnbaum’s theorem lies in excluding this last
hypothesis from the statement of the theorem. The same qualification applies
to the result proved in Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986) where the statement
of the theorem should have been: if we accept the relation C and we accept all
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the equivalences generated by C, then this is equivalent to accepting L.
The way out of the difficulties posed by Birnbaum’s theorem, and the result
relating C and L, is to acknowledge that additional hypotheses are required for
the results to hold. Certainly these results seem to lose their impact when they
are correctly stated and we realize that an equivalence relation generated by a
relation is not necessarily meaningful. It is necessary to provide an argument as
to why the generated equivalence relation captures the essence of the relation
that generates it and it is not at all clear how to do this in these cases.
As we have noted, the essential result in all of this is C¯ = L and this has
some content albeit somewhat minor. Furthermore, the proof of this result is
based on a defect in C, namely, it is not an equivalence relation due to the
general nonexistence of unique maximal ancillaries. As such it is hard to accept
C as stated as any kind of characterization of statistical evidence. Given the
intuitive appeal of this relation in some simple examples, however, resolving
the difficulties with C still poses a major challenge for a frequentitst theory of
statistics.
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